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NEWS&ANALYSIS 
ARTICLES 
Reading the Clean Air Act After Brown & Williamson 
by Michael Herz1 
I. Introduction 
Smoking is not considered an environmental issue. Con-
gress has kept the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) out of the tobacco regulation game by excluding to-
bacco from coverage under the statute otherwise most ap-
propriate for that use, the Toxic Substances Control Act, 2 
and EPA's halting steps toward regulation of secondhand 
smoke have hit a judicial roadblock. 3 Nonetheless, tobacco 
lurks on the fringes of environmental law and policy-not 
least because, as the single most significant threat to public 
health, it provides a benchmark against which environmen-
tal risks are often measured (usually by those arguing 
against regulating those risks). Now federal tobacco regula-
tion has led to a judicial decision of potentially great signifi-
cance for environmental lawyers: Food & Drug Administra-
tion v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 4 Though not an 
"environmental case" as such, Brown & Williamson holds 
important lessons for environmental law and litigation. 
After a brief description of the opinions in the case, I 
will comment on two aspects of the decision of particular 
importance to environmental lawyers: the Court's handling 
of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. 5 and its reliance on post-enactment develop-
ments in interpreting a statute. 
Il. The Court's Decision in Brown & Williamson 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)6 au-
thorizes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regu-
1. 1be author is currently Visiting Professor of Law at the New York 
University School of Law. He is a professor at the Cardozo School of Law, 
Yeshiva University, where he has taught since 1988. Previously, he was an 
attorney for the Environmental Defense Fund and a law clerk for Justice 
Byron White. He is a graduate of Swarthmore College and the University 
of Chicago Law School. 
2. 15 U.S.C. §§2601-2692, ELR STAT. TSCA §§2-412 (Toxic 
Substances Control Act). See id. §2602(2)(A)(iii), ELR STAT. TSCA 
§3(2)(A)(iii) (defining "chemical substance" to exclude "tobacco or any 
tobacco product"). 
3. See Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. 
Supp. 2d 435, 28 ELR 21445 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (vacating large 
portions of a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report on 
passive smoking). 
4. 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). 
5. 467 U.S. 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984). 
late "drugs" and "devices. "7 Throughout almost its entire 
history, the FDA took the position that tobacco cigarettes 
were neither a drug nor a device and that it lacked authority 
to regulate them. In 1996, it flipped. Asserting that nicotine 
is a "drug," it issued regulations prohibiting the sale of ciga-
rettes to minors and regulating other activities that were 
likely to promote or facilitate smoking among minors. 8 The 
regulations were challenged by tobacco manufacturers, re-
tailers, and advertisers on the ground that the statute simply 
does not extend to tobacco products. The U.S. District Court 
for the Middle District of North Carolina upheld the regula-
tions9; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
versed10; and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, concluding 
that the FFDCA does not grant the FDA jurisdiction over 
these products. 11 
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the five-Justice 
majority (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) concluded that Congress had 
precluded FDA regulation of tobacco. Although acknowl-
edging that the agency's position rested on a plausible read-
ing of the actual text of the statute, the majority emphasized 
the importance of context in statutory interpretation 12 and 
examined the statute as a whole and the overall legislative 
scheme. It made two basic points. First, as it read the statute, 
if the FDA had jurisdiction over tobacco, it would have no 
choice but to ban tobacco products, but Congress had ex-
pressly precluded such a step. Therefore, tobacco products 
"simply do not fit" within the FFDCA scheme and the 
agency's reading of the statute was nonsensical. 13 Second, 
6. 21 u.s.c. §§301-395. 
7. Id. §§32l(g)-(h), 393. 
8. Food & Drug Admin., Regulations Restricting the Sale and 
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and 
Adolescents, 42 Fed. Reg. 44396 (Aug. 28, 1996). 
9. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 996 F. Supp. 1374 
(M.D.N.C. 1997). 
10. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153 
F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1999). 
11. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. 
Ct. 1291 (2000). 
12. Id. at 1300-01. 
13. Id. at 1301-06. 
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the Court emphasized Congress' actions, and inaction, re-
garding the regulation of tobacco since 1965-a period long 
after the passage of the FFDCA. It noted Congress' repeated 
consideration and rejection of bills that would have given 
the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco, its "specific intent" in 
six pieces oflegislation directly addressing tobacco, and the 
fact that all such legislation was enacted against the back-
ground of and in reliance on the FD A's assertion that it could 
not regulate tobacco. According to the majority, this added 
up to more than "simple inaction by Congress that purport-
edly represents it acquiescence in an agency's position"; 
rather, through actual legislation, Congress had "effectively 
ratified the FDA's previous position."14 
Finally, the majority turned to Chevron. As the first 
two sections of the opinion presaged, it declined to defer to 
the agency's interpretation, staying squarely in Chevron's 
step one. It had two complementary reasons for doing so. 
First, for the reasons summarized above, it thought the stat-
ute was clear and dispositive. Second, the Court was unwill-
ing to treat whatever ambiguity there might be (and it was 
unwilling to admit there was much) as an implicit delegation 
given the nature of the issue. It deemed it unlikely that Con-
gress would have delegated such a momentous, politically 
charged, and consequential decision to the FDA, at least not 
without a clearer and more direct statement. 15 Relying on an 
idea generally associated with Justice Breyer, and citing an 
article by him, 16 the Court noted that whether Congress has 
delegated decisionmaking authority to an agency turns in 
part on the nature and importance of the issue; the more sig-
nificant the issue, the less likely that Congress has handed it 
to an agency. 
Writing for the four dissenters-Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-Justice Breyer took the op-
posite tack on each of the three parts of the majority's opin-
ion. He briefly made the point that the language and purpose 
of the FFDCA supported the FDA's assertion of jurisdio-
tion.17 This is hard to quarrel with, and the majority had not 
done so. Justice Breyer then turned to the majority's reasons 
for ignoring the natural reading of the statute. First, he of-
fered a reading of the statute under which the FDA could 
14. Id. at 1306-14. 
15. Id. at 1314-15. 
16. Id. (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and 
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986)). 
17. Id. at 1316-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
18. Id. at 1322-26. 
19. Id. at 1326. 
20. Id. at 1328-30. 
21. Id. at 1320-21, 1328-31. 
22. This was the approach taken by the government In its reply brief, for 
example, the FDA asserted: 
The relevant indicia of congressional intent .. . do not come 
close to establishing that Congress "directly addressed the 
precise question at issue" and "unambiguously expressed 
[its] intent" that tobacco products fall outside the reach of the 
FDCA. 467 U.S. at 843. To the contrary, the text, legislative 
history, and administrative interpretation of the Act strongly 
regulate tobacco without banning it, thereby avoiding the 
majority's conundrum that the only permissible regulatory 
action was in fact impermissible. 18 Second, he expressed 
grave doubts about relying on later congressional inaction 
or enactments to understand existing statutes. Emphasizing 
that Congress had never directly come to grips with the 
question of FDA authority, he observed that after the FDA 
had asserted jurisdiction Congress considered but failed to 
enact legislation to deny it such authority. Thus the legisla-
tive record was, in Breyer's slightly peculiar phrase, "criti-
cally ambivalent."19 Finally, Justice Breyer argued that 
changes in available information-both as to the activities 
of the tobacco companies and as to scientific understand-
ing-along with a policy change accompanying a change of 
presidential administration, amply justified the FDA's shift 
in position. 20 
Justice Breyer cited Chevron, but only in passing, 
and his arguments rest much more on the FFDCA itself than 
on a pitch for deference. At times he uses the language and 
concepts of Chevron step two, asserting that the FDA's in-
terpretation was not "unreasonable" and emphasizing the 
policymaking freedom and democratic accountability of the 
agency. 21 But much of the opinion is devoted to refuting the 
majority's interpretation of the Act directly and concluding 
that, correctly interpreted, the FFDCA itself grants the FDA 
the asserted authority. And Justice Breyer seems almost in-
tentionally to eschew the "step one" and "step two" lan-
guage and dichotomy. If one were to impose that vocabulary 
onto the opinion, one would say that Justice Breyer con-
cluded: (a) that this was a Chevron step one case because the 
statute gives the FDA authority to regulate tobacco, and 
(b) that the statute is at most ambiguous and therefore, un-
der step two, the Court had to defer to the agency's reason-
able interpretation. 22 But that is not what Justice Breyer 
himself says. 
III. Understanding Brown & Williamson 
The opinions in Brown & Williamson invite two sorts of ob-
vious criticisms. The first is that the Court ignored Chevron 
and failed appropriately to defer to the FDA.23 For example, 
support FD A's conclusion that, given the overwhelming evi-
dence that the nicotine in tobacco products is intended to be 
used to sustain addiction and as a sedative, stimulant, and ap-
petite suppressant, tobacco products are drug-delivery de-
vices within the meaning of the FDCA. At the very least, 
FDA's conclusion is based on "a permissible construction" 
of the Act. Ibid. 
Reply Brief for the Petitioner Food and Drug Administration at 19, 
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 
S. Ct. 1291 (2000) (No. 98-1152). 
23. This was a repeated objection to the Fourth Circuit's decision, which 
the Supreme Court affirmed. See, e.g., Joseph A. Fazioli, Chevron Up in 
Smoke?: Tobacco at the Crossroads of Administrative Law, 22 HARV. J.L. 
& PuB. PoL'Y 1057 (1999); Michael R. McPherson, The Denial of FDA 
Jurisdiction Over Tobacco in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. 
FDA: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 3 QuINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 133, 
153-54 (1999-2000); Marguerite Sullivan, Brown & Williamson v. FDA· 
Finding Congressional Intent Through Creative Statutory 
Interpretation-A Departure From Chevron, 94 Nw. L. REv. 273 (1999); 
Casenote, 112 HARV. L. REV. 572 (1998). 
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writing in a previous issue of the Environmental Law Re-
porter, Jim O'Reilly entitled his Article about the decision 
"Chevron Goes Up in Smoke" and asserted that the Court 
"distort[ ed] the Chevron standard. "24 And, before the Fourth 
Circuit or the Supreme Court had ruled, Cass Sunstein wrote 
a nuanced defense of the FD A's regulation that emphasized 
Chevron and the role of agencies in refining and updating 
congressional enactments. 2!l My own view is that the Court's 
Chevron analysis was basically correct and consistent with 
its own past practice. Right or wrong, both the majority and 
the dissenting <;>pinions have important lessons for the future 
application of Chevron, which I explore in Part III.A. 
The second predictable criticism of the Brown & Wil-
liamson opinions concerns the methodology of statutory in-
terpretation. In this era of struggle between "textualists" and 
"intentionalists," it is striking that the Court's more conser-
vative members-including, without a separate concur-
rence, Justice Scalia-joined an opinion that virtually ig-
nores the text of the provision at issue. The Court instead 
rests on a "clear" congressional "intent" that is "expressed 
in the FFDCA's overall regulatory scheme and in the to-
bacco-specific legislation that it has enacted subsequent to 
the FFDCA,"26 but, awkwardly, not in the directly applica-
ble text itself. At the same time, the more liberal members of 
the Court, including the two leading proponents of a reliance 
on legislative history, Justices Stevens and Breyer,27 here 
sound like Scalian formalists, both in style and substance, 
admonishing that "a legislative atmosphere is not a law, un-
less it is embodied in a statutory word or phrase."28 
Whatever the merits of one interpretative approach 
over the other, there has been some convenient trading of 
methodologies here, which I explore in Part III.B. Beyond 
that, the Court's reliance on post-enactment developments 
has direct relevance to at least one critical environmental is-
sue that is now being litigated: the question whether EPA 
must consider costs in setting national ambient air quality 
standards (NAAQS). I tum to that issue in Part IV. 
A. The Application and Scope of Chevron in and After 
Brown & Williamson 
At the time it was decided, and in the ensuing yea,rs, Chevron 
was seen as a blow to environmental groups. The specific 
regulation upheld by the Court-applying the "bubble pol-
icy" to new source review requirements in nonattainment 
areas-had been a Reagan Administration initiative, revers-
ing the ostensibly more environmentally protective position 
that had been taken by the Carter Administration. More 
broadly and importantly, the message of strong judicial def-
erence to agency decisions that the Chevron decision con-
tained, or that the lower courts later discovered in it, was 
threatening to environmental groups. In the eyes of enviNm-
24. James T. O'Reilly, Chevron Goes Up in Smoke: Did the Supreme 
Court Reward Gridlock Tactics in the Cigarette Decision?, 30 ELR 
10574, 10575 (July 2000). 
25. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as 
Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013 (1998). 
26. 120 S. Ct. at 1297. 
mentalists, the deferential stance would lead to the loss of 
hard-won congressional gains because the federal judiciary 
consisting primarily of Democratic appointees would yield 
to Republican agency preferences rather than interpreting 
and enforcing largely Democratic statutes themselves. 
I was an attorney with the Environmental Defense 
Fund in the mid-1980s, and I recall more than one worried 
strategy discussion among lawyers for environmental 
groups working on briefs that actually supported a particu-
lar agency decision. There was real concern that any reli-
ance on Chevron might help win the battle but would ulti-
mately lead to losing the war. It seemed clear to us that, be-
cause the agency was the usual opponent, the environmen-
tally preferable approach was to downplay Chevron in order 
to preserve a strong judicial role in overseeing agency 
decisionmaking and enforcing congressional decisions. 
And surely the first generation of Chevron articles-in 
which conservatives embraced and liberals attacked the de-
cision-can be suspected of being motivated (at least a lit-
tle, if only subconsciously) by the authors' substantive pref-
erence for the outcomes they expected from the judiciary as 
opposed to those they expected from agencies. 
How times have changed. With a federal judiciary at 
least until recently dominated by Reagan and Bush appoint-
ees, a Republican Congress, and a Democratic administra-
tion, the constellation of players and forces has completely 
shifted. Now a strong reading of Chevron means greater 
agency autonomy, which means more vigorous regulation. 
As a result, the endorsements and attacks on strong defer-
ence are coming from opposite quarters. 29 
1. The Supreme Court's Chevron Analysis in Brown & 
Williamson 
This realignment was nowhere more clear than leading up 
to, and in the wake of, the tobacco case. As in Chevron itself, 
though in a more consequential and visible setting, the to-
bacco case arose because a federal agency had abandoned a 
prior policy and adopted a new reading of its statute. This 
time, however, the new reading delighted activists and dis-
mayed the regulated community, as it promised significant 
new regulatory burdens rather than increasing the flexibility 
of existing ones. Citing Chevron, but not in fact deferring to 
the agency, the Court held that the agency's action was in-
consistent with the statute. As a result, some have celebrated 
the decision for its antiregulatory effects. One lawyer for the 
prevailing side has written that "[t]obacco companies are 
not the only beneficiaries of the decision," which "also 
promises relief to other victims of over-zealous agency reg-
ulation whose statutory challenges too often founder on 
21. See generally Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative 
History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 205. 
28. 120 S. Ct. at 1331. 
29. As this is written, the November 2000 election has yet to occur; it 
could, of course, again realign the players. 
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simplistic readings of' Chevron. 30 
That assessment should be modified slightly. Brown 
& Williamson promises relief to those affected by over-zeal-
ous agency action-whether it be regulation or deregula-
tion-where "over-zealous" is defined as "inconsistent with 
the relevant statute." But in asserting meaningful judicial 
oversight, Brown & Williamson is not new. Rather, while in-
consistent with much of the received wisdom about Chev-
ron, the Court's approach is consistent with a proper reading 
of that decision. 
Certainly Brown & Williamson is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's actual practice, which has been consis-
tently nondeferential. Professor Thomas Merrill has con-
firmed this general impression: the Supreme Court has not 
been more deferential to agency interpretations since Chev-
ron was decided than it was before.31 Sometimes the Court 
cites Chevron but does not defer, as in Brown & Williamson; 
other times it does not even cite Chevron.32 
The Court's apparent failure to follow its own teach-
ings can give rise to two responses: either we can shake our 
heads about the Court's lack of self-restraint, orwe can won-
der whether we have misunderstood the supposedly ne-
glected teachings. I would suggest that the latter is the case. 
The Court's actual practice, while no doubt inconsistent in 
its specifics and from time to time in error, overall reflects 
the appropriate understanding of Chevron. In Brown & Wil-
liamson, all nine Justices were trying to determine the better 
reading of the statute. That was not self-evident. Statutory 
meaning is never self-evident in a case that makes it all the 
way to the Supreme Court. (And what better proof, or defi-
nition, of "ambiguity" can there be than a 5-4 division 
among Supreme Court Justices?) But not one of the Justices 
seemed to think that such "ambiguity" triggered step two of 
Chevron and required deference to the agency. Rather, both 
the majority and the dissent grappled with text, purpose, his-
tory, common sense, and legal context-in Chevron's terms, 
"the traditional tools of statutory construction"33-to reach 
a conclusion as to the statute's meaning. 
To be more precise, all nine Justices were trying to 
determine the statutory boundaries on agency action. Five 
Justices thought that the FFDCA precluded FDA regulation 
of tobacco; that is a Chevron step-one inquiry. The four dis-
30. Thomas W. Kirby, Giving Agencies Less Deference Tobacco 
Decision Looked Broadly for Congress ' Intent, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 27, 
2000, at 66. 
31 . Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron 
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994). The decision does seem to have 
led to a greater respect for agency decisions in the courts of appeals. See 
Aaron P. Avila, Application of the Chevron Doctrine in the D. C. Circuit, 8 
N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 308 (2000); Peter H. Schuck& E. Donald Elliott, To 
the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 984. 
32. For one of many examples, see Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 120 
S. Ct. 1815, 30 ELR 20566 (2000). 
33. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9, 14 ELR at 20508-09 n.9. 
34. Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation 
and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187,221 (1992). 
As Professor Monaghan wrote the year before Chevron came down, 
"[j]udicial deference to agency 'interpretation' oflaw is simply one way of 
recognizing a delegation of law making authority to an agency." Henry P. 
senters concluded that the statute allowed but did not require 
FDA regulation of tobacco. That is also a step-one inquiry. 
The case illustrates the simple proposition that in any case of 
administrative action under statutory limits, a court must de-
termine the boundaries of agency authority. "Congress may 
have given an agency lots of room or almost none, but the 
boundaries are by definition set by Congress and hence for 
judicial identification. "34 
Consider in this regard Justice Breyer's discussion of 
the FDA's flip-flop as to its authority to regulate tobacco. 
Majority and dissent correctly agree that an agency's rever-
sal does not defeat or dilute Chevron deference. 35 But Justice 
Breyer attacks the majority for nonetheless holding the FDA 
to its initial interpretation, despite what he argues are more 
than ample reasons for the flip-flop. Just as the majority had 
cited Justice Breyer's article against him, so here Justice 
Breyer invokes Chief Justice Rehnquist's well-known sepa-
rate opinion in the air bags case. In that opinion, then-Justice 
Rehnquist had defended shifts in agency policies that fol-
lowed on the arrival of new presidential administrations: 
"As long as the agency remains within the bounds estab-
lished by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative re-
cords and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the 
administration."36 But Justice Breyer is not exactly hoisting 
the majority on its own petard here. It is a complete response 
to Justice Breyer to italicize the opening qualifier: as long as 
the agency remains within the bounds established by Con-
gress. Whether the agency has done so is always, and by def-
inition, a judicial, step-one inquiry. The Brown & William-
son majority concluded that the agency had overstepped 
those bounds. 
Whether the majority was correct in that conclusion, 
I do not know. But at the level of methodology, there was 
nothing striking or untoward about the opinion. Indeed, 
viewing Brown & Williamson in Chevron terms, there was 
no significant disagreement; the majority and the dissent 
adopted essentially the same methodology, they just dis-
agreed about what the statute meant. 
2. The Scope of Chevron After Brown & Williamson 
So where does that leave us with regard to Chevron's scope? 
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 
26 (1983). See also Montana v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
( deferring "to an agency's interpretation constitutes a judicial 
detennination that Congress has delegated the norm-elaboration function 
to the agency"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985). 
35. See Food & Drug Adrnin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
120 S. Ct. 1291, 1313 (2000)("Certainly, an agency's initial interpretation 
of a statute that it is charged with administering is not 'carved in stone."') 
(quoting Chevron, 467U.S. at 863, 14 ELRat20514); id. at 1328 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) ("[T]he FDA's change of positions does not make a 
significant legal difference."). Chevron itself, of course, involved a new 
and contradictory agency position that merited "Chevron deference." 
36. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass' n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59, 13 ELR 20672, 20680 (1983) (Rehnquist, 
J., concurring and dissenting), quoted in Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct. 
at 1330 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Three central, recurrent, and related issues arise with regard 
to the scope of step one. First, does mere ambiguity or uncer-
tainty as to statutory meaning trigger step two? Second, if 
so, how compelling must a particular interpretation be to 
keep a court from deferring? Must Congress really have ad-
dressed "the precise question at issue,"37 or might a court 
conclude that Congress came close enough for government 
work? How clear is clear?38 Is it enough that a court feels 
confident that it has identified the "better" of two or more 
plausible readings, 39 or must it be convinced that there is 
only one plausible interpretation? Third, what materials 
should a court examine in making that determination? 
Should it examine only "the plain language of the stat-
ute,"40 or should it consider other sources of statutory 
meaning, such as legislative history, purpose, or policy, as 
it did in Chevron itself?41 Brown & Williamson helps an-
swer these questions. 
First, the Court confirms that ambiguity itself can be 
an implicit delegation of decisionmaking authority to the 
agency triggering step two.42 This approach is mistaken, I 
think, but I am not the Supreme Court. 
Second, it has little directly to say on the "how clear is 
clear'' question, which is by its nature frustratingly hard to 
pin down. There is no metric for quantifying statutory clar-
ity and no mechanism for policing judicial assertions that a 
disputed text is "clear." Judges tend to be, or at least pretend 
to be, pretty confident in their conclusions. Hence the 
not-so-rare-as-one-might-think phenomenon of all judges 
in a case agreeing that a statute is clear but disagreeing as 
to what it clearly means. For what it is worth, two con-
flicting hints can be found in the majority opinion. On the 
one hand, it at least purports to set the bar of clarity rather 
high. It expressed little doubt and was confident that it 
had found the "clear intent" of Congress. On the other 
hand, the statute undeniably was ambiguous, given the 
conflict between text and context, but the majority stayed 
in step one notwithstanding. 
Much more importantly, the majority emphasized a 
second variable besides the clarity, or lack thereof, of the 
statute: an inquiry into "the nature of the question pre-
sented." In some cases, apparently, a particular level of am-
biguity will trigger step two, and in some cases it will not. 
Whether it does so depends on whether it makes sense to 
presume that Congress has indeed handed over the 
decisionmaking authority to the agency. "[W]e are confi-
dent that Congress could not have intended to delegate a de-
cision of such economic and political significance to an 
31. Chevron, 461 U.S. at 842, 14 ELR at 20508. 
38. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations 
of I.Aw, 1989 DUKE L.J. 5ll, 520-21 (predicting that Chevron battles 
would tum on the question of "how clear is clear"). 
39. Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of I.Aw and 
Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821 , 826-27: 
Of course I can-as can any judge-always determine which 
of the parties has the better interpretation of a statute, but as I 
understand and appreciate Chevron, it imposes a discipline 
on judges to stop and ask ourselves this question: if we, as 
counselor for the petitioner or general counsel of the agency, 
had been asked to write an opinion letter on the applicability 
agency in so cryptic a fashion.''43 The Court's language and 
approach suggest that it will not defer under Chevron on ma-
jor, politically salient issues, even if the statutory language 
is unclear. Put differently, Chevron deference hinges on a 
policymaking delegation, and while the requisite delegation 
can sometimes be found simply through Congress' use of 
vague language, such an implicit delegation will be found 
only for minor, ·interstitial questions. 
Finally, with regard to the materials to be consulted 
within step one, it is notable that all nine Justices operated 
within a very broad step one, in which they looked well be-
yond the language, plain or otherwise, of the provision at is-
sue. As in Chevron itself, the "traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation" were broadly understood. In Chevron, the 
Court deferred only when those tools proved fruitless; in 
Brown & Williamson it did not need to defer because those 
tools provided a satisfactorily firm answer. I consider just 
what those tools were in the next section. For present pur-
poses, the point is simply that they go far beyond the lan-
guage of the text. The step-one mansion has many rooms. 
B. Acquiescence, Ratification, and Post-Enactment 
Legislative History 
The striking feature of the majority's opinion is its reliance 
on legislative developments that came after passage of the 
directly applicable statute. The individual Justices in the 
Brown & Williamson majority are usually wary about rely-
ing on legislative history generally, and post-enactment leg-
islative history in particular, and have shied away from the 
idea oflegislative acquiescence or ratification of judicial or 
administrative interpretations. 
What effect should actions taken by a legislator or a 
legislature after a statute is enacted have on our understand-
ing of that statute? Two polar positions are easily identified. 
At one extreme, legislative action or inaction subsequent to 
enactment simply has no bearing whatsoever on the stat-
ute's meaning; at the other, interpreters must be continually 
alert to current legislative understandings or preferences. 
Courts tend to fall between these poles in practice, although 
closer to the first. 
In part, the magnetic pull of these poles depends on 
exactly what kind of evidence of post-enactment legislative 
understanding is at issue. Statements by an individual legis-
lator, or even a committee, about the meaning of a past en-
actment are almost always rejected out-of-hand and are gen-
erally seen as the weakest sort of indication oflegislative in-
of the statute to the facts, what would it have looked 
like-would we have told our client it was a relatively 
close question? 
40. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 
503 U.S. 407,417 (1992) ("If the agency interpretation is not in conflict 
with the plain language of the statute, deference is due."). 
41. Chevron,461U.S. at851 -54, 862-64, 14ELRat2051 l,20513-14. 
42. Food & Drug Adrnin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. 
Ct. 1291, 1314 (2000). 
43 . Id. at 1315. 
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tent 44 Thus, in Environmental Defense Fund v. City of Chi-
cago,45 which held that the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act's46 household waste exemption does not apply to 
ash from waste-to-energy incinerators, the plaintiffs relied 
on letters from an individual U.S. representative and six 
U.S. senators to the EPA Administrator. Appearing more 
than three years after the relevant provision had been en-
acted (and, suspiciously and surely not coincidentally, on 
the same day), the letters set out their authors' view that 
Congress had not exempted ash from subtitle C regulation. 
While agreeing with this reading of the statute, the court of 
appeals dismissed the letters as simply irrelevant: "post-en-
actment statements, such as we have here, bear no neces~ary 
relationship to the forces at work at the time of enactment, 
the preferences of the enacting legislator and his or her con-
stituency, and the impact of pressure groups. "47 This disdain 
for post-enactment legislative history is typical.48 
It is important to see why this is the standard ap-
proach. The essential concern with post-enactment legisla-
tive history of this sort is its reliability. There is almost no 
reason to trust, and every reason to be suspicious of, the indi-
vidual member of Congress who says "this is what we meant 
five years ago." Given the passage of time, the incentive for 
strategic deception of others and of oneself, the absence of 
any check on or consequences from what is said, the possi-
bility of individual changes of mind, and the fact that no one 
is listening, individual statements made after the fact are 
useless at best as indicators of the prevailing understanding 
or purpose at the time of enactment. 
Courts have been less quick to dismiss another sort of 
post-enactment legislative history: the failure of Congress 
to amend a statute that has been given a particular judicial or 
administrative interpretation. Courts not infrequently take 
congressional inaction as approval of a prevailing interpre-
tation. The best-known example of this approach is Flood v. 
Kuhn, 49 in which the Supreme Court stood by its long-stand-
ing, though peculiar, reading of the antitrust laws to exempt 
professional baseball. But the Court has been completely in-
consistent with regard to this approach; relying on it heavily 
in some cases, rejecting it in others.50 
44. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 
281-82 (1947). In a well-known and typically memorable statement, 
Justice Scalia once objected to the Court's going to the trouble of 
explicitly rejecting, in a footnote, the losing party's reliance on statements 
in committee documents produced after passage of the statute at issue: 
"Arguments based on subsequent legislative history . .. should not be 
taken seriously, not even in a footnote." Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 
617,632 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (joining all of the Court's opinion 
except for the offending footnote) . 
45. 511 U.S. 328, 24 ELR 20810 (1994). 
46. 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6992k, ELR STAT. RCRA §§1001-11011 
(Rcsowce Conservation and Recovery Act). 
47. Environmental Defense Fund v. City of Chicago, 948 F.2d 345, 351, 
22ELR20125, 20128 (7th Cir. 1991),a.ff'd, 511 U.S. 328, 24 ELR20810 
(1994). Justice Scalia authored the Supreme Court's opinion affirming the 
Seventh Circuit; not surprisingly, he did not mention the letters. See also 
511 U.S. at 337, 24 ELR at 20812 (briefly dismissing any reliance on the 
Senate Committee Report, since "it is the statute, and not the Committee 
Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law"). 
48. "We have observed on more than one occasion that the interpretation 
There are two sorts of objections to relying on Con-
gress' failure to amend a statute as an indication of the cor-
rectness of the prevailing interpretation. One concern is, 
again, reliability. As many have pointed out, legislative in-
action can have all sorts of explanations other than approval 
of the status quo, including ignorance, the press of other 
business, disagreement as to what should replace the pre-
vailing error, confusion over what the status quo is, filibus-
ter or other minority procedural maneuver, fear of a presi-
dential veto, or all manner of political calculations.51 The 
other objection is quite different; it attacks not the accuracy 
of the inference of congressional approval but its relevance. 
Under traditional understandings, legislation survives its 
enacting coalition; a later Congress can alter a predecessor's 
action only by amending it; courts look to the "legislative in-
tent" of the enacting legislature. Justice Scalia has made this 
point with some force in an opinion for the Court: 
"Only time will tell," [the dissent] says, "whether the 
Court ... has correctly interpreted the will of Congress." 
The implication is that today's holding will be proved 
wrong if Congress amends the law to conform with [the 
interpretation advanced by the] dissent. We think not. 
The "will of Congress" we look to is not a will evolving 
from Session to Session, but a will expressed and fixed 
in a particular enactment. Otherwise, we would speak 
not of"interpreting" the law but of"intuiting" or "pre-
dicting" it. Our role is to say what the law, as hitherto 
enacted1 is; not to forecast what the law, as amended, 
will be.'2 
On this theory, the views of later Congresses-the inactive 
ones-are simply irrelevant to the meaning of the statute. 
Congress cannot acquiesce in or ratify an interpretation by 
leaving it alone; the only constitutionally relevant action it 
can take is to make laws, pursuant to the constitutionally 
prescribed procedures. Even if a court were utterly confi-
dent that the current Congress concurred in a judicial or ad-
ministrative reading of a statute, that fact would be irrele-
vant to the correct interpretation of the statute. Congressio-
nal silence, like the legislative veto, is not a constitutionally 
given by one Congress (or a Committee or Member thereof) to an earlier 
statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute." 
Public Employees' Rct. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989). 
49. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
50. An inconsistency it acknowledged in one of the most striking 
examples of a refusal to accept the legislative ratification argument, 
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 
(1994) (5-4) (holding that Securities and Exchange Act §lO(b) docs not 
create a private right of action against those who aided and abetted stock 
fraud). In rejecting an interpretation that had prevailed for 60 years, the 
Court pooh-poohed any reliance on legislative inaction as support for that 
interpretation. However, it did observe that "[i]t is true that our cases have 
not been consistent in rejecting arguments such as these." Id. at 187. 
51. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 
650 (1990); HENRY M . HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS 1358-60 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickcy eds., 
1994). 
52. West Va. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101-02 n.7 (1991). 
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permissible manner of "legislating."53 
In considering these objections, two versions of the 
acquiescence argument should be distinguished. The 
weaker version is acquiescence in the form of complete in-
action. In terms of both reliability and relevance, mere con-
gressional failure to override a judicial or administrative in-
terpretation is easiest to attack. The stronger version is 
sometimes called "the reenactment rule." It is a particular-
ized application of the same principle, but in circumstances 
where the objections are less compelling. As the Court put 
it many years ago, "the reenactment by Congress, without 
change, of a statute, which had previously received long 
continued executive construction, is an adoption by Con-
gress of such construction. "54 The practical concerns about 
reliability are diminished here, because there is an indica-
tion that Congress has in fact been paying attention and 
made a conscious, deliberate decision. And the theoretical 
concerns about relevance are diminished because Con-
gress has in fact legislated, the issue is only the meaning 
that should be attached to its action. Nonetheless, 
reenactment only reduces these concerns, it does not elimi-
nate them. 
This debate over later legislative developments is it-
self part of a larger debate about whether statutory meaning 
and statutory interpretation can be, should be, or unavoid-
ably are, dynamic.55 That debate will not be resolved here. 
Two points bear mentioning, however, with regard to Brown 
& Williamson. 
First, the methodologies of the individual Justices are 
notable -not jaw-dropping, but certainly eyebrow-raising. 
The conservative wing, which formed the majority, is gener-
ally associated with varying degrees of skepticism or hostil-
ity to extra-textual sources generally, post-enactment legis-
lative history in particular, and any notion of evolving statu-
tory meaning. These Justices take a rather formal view of 
what constitutes binding statutory law and are reluctant to 
look beyond the applicable statutory text itself. Yet it is the 
majority that essentially ignores the text of the statute and 
instead relies on legal developments occurring years after its 
enactment. The Justices in the liberal wing, who dissented in 
Brown & Williamson, are generally associated with a more 
broad ranging investigation of statutory meaning, a review 
53. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.l (1989) 
(rejecting legislative acquiescence argument because "Congress may 
legislate ... only through the passage of a bill which is approved by both 
Houses and signed by the President" and "Congressional inaction cannot 
amend a duly enacted statute"); cf Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 13 ELR 20663 (1983) (striking down legislative 
veto because it was a type of "legislation" that did not result from 
constitutionally prescribed procedures). 
54. United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337, 339 
(1908). See also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) 
("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judi'eial 
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts 
a statute without change."). 
55. One professor has labeled this 
the most fundamental issue about statutory interpretation. 
Should interpreters regard a statutory enactment as fixed in 
time, not giving weight to events after passage, or should they 
take statutory language as an evolving part of the whole body 
of overall legal context, and a willingness to abandon text. 
Yet it is the dissent that relies on text and formalistically in-
sists that the only relevant act a legislature can take is to en-
act or amend a statute directly-in Justice Breyer's phrase, 
"a legislative atmosphere is not a law, unless it is embodied 
in a statutory word or phrase."56 
Complaints about methodological inconsistencies 
on the part ofindividual Justices are common, they are easy 
to make, and they are often well-founded. But they do not 
get you very far. On the one hand, of course Supreme Court 
Justices, like everyone (and like lawyers more than most), 
are not perfectly consistent. It's so obvious a point as almost 
not to be interesting. On the other hand, it is easily and often 
overstated. The opinions in Brown & Williamson are not 
quite the about-face that they may seem to be. The majority 
insists that this was not a run-of-the-mill legislative acquies-
cence case. 57 It felt compelled to portray this as an unusual 
situation, unlike the myriad cases in which Congress has 
done nothing in the face of an accepted interpretation. The 
majority's point was that the long-standing interpretation 
had been woven into the fabric of the law; Congress had not 
simply left it alone, it had relied on it, legislated around it, 
and developed an overall regulatory scheme that depended 
on it. If this description is accurate (the dissenters were un-
convinced), it makes the strongest case for relying on later 
congressional action to inform one's understanding of an 
earlier statute-not just acquiescence, nor even just 
reenactment, but, in the Court's words, "effective ratifica-
tion." Taken at face value, the majority addresses the con-
cerns of both reliability and relevance discussed above. 
As one with no particular familiarity with food and 
. drug law, I cannot speak to the validity of the majority's 
reading of the particular laws in question. But I found its ar-
gument a plausible interpretation of what Congress had 
done. More important, it was not only a coherent but a wel-
come approach at the methodological level. 
Similarly, the dissent does not wholly retreat into 
narrow formalism, rejecting any examination of post-enact-
ment events and overall context. To a significant extent, it 
meets the majority on its own terms, contesting that the spe-
cific conclusions it draws from the specific congressional 
actions over the years. Moreover, it accepts a sort of dy-
of the law, considering various post-enactment events as af-
fecting how the language should be understood? 
KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 
227 (1999). 
56. l 20 S. Ct. at 1331 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Cf In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 
1340, 1342-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook. J.) ("An opinion poll 
revealing the wishes of Congress would not translate to legal rules. 
Desires become rules only after clearing procedural hurdles . ... "). Justice 
Breyer also invokes Justice Scalia' s not-even-in-a-footnote line. 120 S. 
Ct. at 1326; see supra note 44. 
57. As if seeking to limit the damage, the Court was at pains to stress just 
how unusual the sort of legislative action on which it relied was: "We do 
not rely on Congress' failure to act-its consideration and rejection of 
bills that would have given the FDA this authority-in reaching this 
conclusion. Indeed, this is not a case of simple inaction by Congress that 
purportedly represents its acquiescence in an agency's position." 120 S. 
Ct. at 1312. 
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namic statutory meaning by endorsing the FDA's change 
of position. 
Notwithstanding the perfect conservative/liberal ar-
ray of majority and dissenting Justices, then, Brown & Wil-
liamson is not really an occasion for head-shaking about po-
liticized, result-oriented jurisprudence on the Supreme 
Court. Neither group simply abandoned its usual interpre-
tive principles outright. However, the majority opinion is a 
significant step toward a dynamic understanding of statutes, 
and it countenances a fairly broad inquiry into sources of 
statutory meaning beyond the particular text of the provi-
sion at issue. So one can be sure that future litigants will 
latch on to the relatively open-ended approach take.n by the 
majority and the relatively conservative approach taken by 
the dissent. 
IV. Brown & Williamson and American Trucking 
Brown & Williamson will have an immediate application of 
importance to environmental lawyers. Many of the method-
ological lessons are applicable in the most significant envi-
ronmental case of the current Supreme Court term, Ameri-
can Trucking Ass 'n.58 
The Court granted two separate certiorari petitions 
arising out of the D.C. Circuit's decision setting aside EPA's 
new NAAQS for ozone and particulates.59 In one, Browner 
v. American Trucking Ass 'n, EPA challenges the D.C. Cir-
cuit's ruling that Clean Air Act (CAA)§ 109, at least as inter-
preted by the agency, is an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative authority. Though not directly relevant to that is-
sue, Brown & Williamson suggests that the Court will not 
find an unconstitutional delegation. In the other case, Amer-
ican Trucking Ass 'n v. Browner, industry groups are chal-
lenging the D.C. Circuit's ruling that EPA cannot consider 
costs or economic effects when setting a NAAQS. On that 
issue, Brown & Williamson argues in favor of affirming the 
court of appeals. 
58. Browner v. American Trucking Ass'n, cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2003 
(2000) (No. 99-1257); American Trucking Ass'n v. Browner, cert. 
granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (No. 99-1426). 
59. AmericanTruckingAss'n v. Browner, 175 F.3d 1027, 29ELR21071 
(D.C. Cir.), petition for rehearing granted in part and denied in part and 
opinion modified, 195 F.3d 4, 30 ELR 20119 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
60. Four excellent discussions are Thomas J. McGarity, The Clean Air 
Act at a Crossroads: Statutory Interpretation and Longstanding 
Administrative Practice in the Shadow of the Delegation Doctrine, 9 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2000); Craig N. Oren, Run Over by American 
Trucking Part I: Can EPA Revive Its Air Quality Standards?, 29 ELR 
10653 (Nov. 1999); Richard J. Pierce, The Inherent Limits on Judicial 
Control of Agency Discretion: The D.C. Circuit and the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 63 (2000), and Cass R. Sunstein, ls the 
Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303 (1999). 
61. 42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(l), ELR STAT. CAA §109(b)(l); see also id. 
§7408(a)(2), ELR STAT. CAA§ 108(a)(2) (describing airqualitycriteria). 
62. Two standard examples are "the benzene case," Industrial Union 
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 10 ELR 
20489 (1980) (upholding statutory directive that agency establish 
standards that are "reasonably necessary and appropriate to provide safe or 
healthful employment or places of employment"), and the World War II 
A. Nondelegation 
The nondelegation ruling by the court of appeals has re-
ceived a great deal of attention, most of it highly critical.60 
Two aspects of the D.C. Circuit's opinion produced the most 
head-scratching. First, the relevant provision, CAA 
§109(b)(l), requires EPA to establish primary NAAQS 
"requisite to protect the public health," "allowing for an ade-
quate margin of safety," and "based on" criteria documents 
described in CAA §108.61 Though open-ended, this just 
does not seem any more vague and standardless than any 
number of statutes that the Court has upheld against 
nondelegation challenges.62 Second, the court of appeals 
thought that the statutory defect could be cured by a con-
trolling agency interpretation. It acknowledged that this 
would not serve a central purpose of the nondelegation 
doctrine, viz. ensuring that the elected legislature makes 
the significant policy decisions. But the court thought an 
agency interpretation would serve the two other purposes: 
allowing for meaningful judicial review and preventing ar-
bitrary and inconsistent agency actions.63 Brown & Wil-
liamson suggests that the Court will be unconvinced by the 
D.C. Circuit's reasoning. 
To be sure, Brown & Williamson can be seen as dis-
playing a judicial wariness toward excessive agency author-
ity. But the more important lesson lies in the Court's reaction 
to the FD A's claim of broad delegated power. That reaction 
was two-fold. First, the Court worked hard to find a particu-
lar, clear congressional intent that precluded the agency's 
action. The dissenters, too, were confident that the statute 
contained significant standards by which to judge the 
agency action. While the FFDCA and related statutes per-
haps gave the Court more to work with than does CAA 
§ 109, the latter is hardly so empty and meaningless that 
judges will be forced to throw up their hands. Second, in the 
context of Chevron, the Court invoked the Breyerian princi-
ple that a court should not find a delegation of policymaking 
authority to an agency when the circumstances would sug-
gest that the issues are the fundamental sort that one would 
price controls case, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) 
( upholding authorization to agency to fix prices of commodities which "in 
his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the 
purposes of this Act"). 
63. This reasoning is hard to fathom. These ideas make lots of sense in the 
adjudicatory setting, when the agency is applying general principles in a 
series of individual enforcement contexts. They are all but inapplicable in 
the rulemaking setting. There is little value in judicial review to ensure that 
an agency's rule is consistent with its (discretionary) interpretation of the 
provision under which the rule is promulgated. And the arbitrariness 
concern is diluted to the point of nonexistence when the agency is 
promulgating a generally applicable rule. The consequence of the D.C. 
Circuit's requirement is that an agency can (and presumably will) do 
exactly what it otherwise would have, just in two steps. To be sure, the 
agency's self-restraining interpretation might ensure consistency from 
one rulemaking to the next. But these equality interests are hardly 
compelling; it just is not that critical that emitters of particulate matter be 
indirectly affected by a NAAQS set under the same approach as the 
NAAQS that indirectly affects emitters of volatile organic compounds, 
particularly since there will be all sorts of inequalities in the 
implementation of the NAAQS. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the 
agency can tie its hands in future rulemakings, especially if there is an 
intervening presidential election. 
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expect Congress itself to resolve. Thus, the Court is willing 
to presume that Congress has not delegated to the agency ba-
sic, fundamental issues, and it will work to find the answers 
to those issues in the statute. And, of course, if it finds such 
answers, then the statute easily survives a nondelegation 
challenge. Finally, all ohhis suggests that the Court will be 
dubious about the D.C. Circuit's notion that the agency can 
solve any nondelegation problem by tying its own hands. 
These indicators of the Court's take on American 
Trucking are not much more than tea leaves. Nonetheless, 
they suggest that the Court will reject the lower court's 
nondelegation ruling. 
B. Reading the CAA 
I. Congressional Ratification 
Since its enactment in 1970, CAA § 109 has been consis-
tently understood by EPA and the courts to preclude consid-
eration of costs in setting a primary NAAQS. When it pro-
mulgated the original set of six NAAQS in 1971, EPA made 
clear its understanding that the CAA "does not permit any 
factors other than health to be taken into account in setting 
the primary standards.''64 It has never questioned or re-
treated from that understanding of the statute. That interpre-
tation is now 30 years old-not quite as long-standing as the 
interpretation the FDA had abandoned in Brown & William-
son, but an impressive run nonetheless. The D.C. Circuit 
adopted the same interpretation in 1980 in Lead Industries 
Ass 'n v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,65 and reaf-
firmed it on several occasions before doing so again in 
American Trucking itself.66 
Before the Supreme Court, both EPA and certain of 
its amici have invoked Brown & Williamson and argued that 
Congress has "effectively ratified" this interpretation.67 The 
argument is a compelling one. As in Brown & Williamson, 
there is more here than mere acquiescence through inaction, 
though there is certainly that. Congress considered and re-
jected legislation that would have altered the prevailing in-
terpretation; it amended CAA § I 09 in other respects but left 
the relevant language untouched. Perhaps most important, it 
has repeatedly addressed the role of costs and feasibility in 
the NAAQS regime through statutory amendments. It has 
made a clear and considered decision to do so through provi-
sions concerning implementation and· attainment of the 
NAAQS rather than by modifying the process or standards 
64. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (Apr. 30, 1971). 
65. 647 F.2d 1130, 10 ELR 20643 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See id. at 1148, 10 
ELR at 20651 ("[T]he statute and its legislative history make clear that 
economic considerations play no part in the promulgation of ambient air 
quality standards under Section 109."). 
66. See American Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d388, 389, 28ELR20481, 
20481 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 902 
F.2d 962,973, 20 ELR 20891, 20896 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 1092 (1991); American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 
1185, 11 ELR20916, 20919 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034 
(1982). 
67. The ratification argument is made by the Solicitor General, see Brief 
for the Federal Respondents at 27-31, and by a group of environmental 
organizations, see Brief for Amici Curiae Environmental Defense et al. at 
for establishing the NAAQS themselves. As in Brown & 
Williamson, Congress has accepted EPA's interpretation and 
legislated "against the backdrop of the [EPA's and the D.C. 
Circuit's] consistent and repeated statements it lacked au-
thority" to consider costs,68 addressing the costs issue else-
where in the statute, and thus "effectively ratifying•'69 the 
prevailing intell?retation. 
2. Chevron and Gridlock 
The foregoing should indicate that I do not think Chevron 
will be much of an issue in American Trucking. Just as in 
Brown & Williamson, the costs issue will likely be resolved 
within step one, with, at the most, a passing statement that 
even if the statute were less clear, the agency's interpretation 
is a reasonable one. 
The setting and posture of American Trucking, how-
ever, do shed some light on concerns about Chevron that 
were voiced after Brown & Williamson came down. Writing 
in these pages, Professor James O'Reilly expressed concern 
that Brown & Williamson creates a "cigarette corollary" to 
Chevron that verges on "anti-deference."70 The cigarette 
corollary would deny deference where, over a period of 
years, neither Congress nor the relevant agency has acted. 
On this reading of Brown & Williamson, Congress' very 
inaction, in the face of the agency's failure to assert juris-
diction, becomes a ratification of the absence of jurisdic-
tion and precludes later assertions of authority, over-
whelming ordinary principles of deference. O'Reilly fears 
that future EPA regulation will be hamstrung by the ciga-
rette corollary, because the environmental arena has seen a 
similar pattern of congressional inaction coupled with oc-
casional passage of relevant legislation against a particular 
administrative backdrop. 
The American Trucking case is a strong 
counterexample to his concern, reminding us that in 
many instances, the agency has acted. In those cases, 
congressional dithering, gridlock, and legislating 
around the edges may cement rather than foreclose an 
expansive interpretation. 
This is precisely the fear ofa group of five U.S. sena-
tors who have filed an amicus brief in American Trucking. 71 
They object that 
to read legislative inaction as approval would work a 
wholesale redistribution of power from the Legislative 
3-15. Several Members of Congress filed amicus briefs urging the Court to 
reject any theory of legislative acquiescence or approval. See id., Brief for 
Senator James M. Inhofe (R-Olda.) et al. at 17-31; BriefofSenator Orrin 
Hatch (R-Utah) and Representative Tom Billey (R-Va.) at 23-25. 
68. Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1306. 
69. Id. at 1313. 
70. O'Reilly, supra note 24, at 10574. 
71. See Brief for Senators James M. Inhofe, Tim Hutchinson, Robert F. 
BeMett, and George Voinovich as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Cross-Petitioners, American Trucking Ass'n v. Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 
(2000) (No. 99-1426). 
31 ELR 10160 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 2-2001 
to the Executive branch. No longer would Congress be 
able to serve as a check on Executive power. Rather, the 
Executive could readily act to extend the outer bounds of 
its authority and if, for whatever reason, Congress did 
not affinnatively act to check that excess, the Judiciary 
would construe that inability as acquiescence. 72 
Discounting the senators' personal stake and their lawyer's 
rhetorical excess, one can see why the senators might be un-
easy. For one of the many unusual things about the tobacco 
case was that the Agency's historical interpretation had been 
self-abnegating. In general, agencies are prone to read their 
powers broadly, not narrowly. That is bureaucratic, if not 
human, nature. For those most suspicious of government 
bureaucracies, EPA may even head the list of ambitious 
overreachers. Professor Todd Zywicki, lamenting "[t]he re-
lentless 'mission creep' of the EPA," has written: 
Bureaucrats seek larger budgets and greater power for 
themselves. In order to sustain large payrolls and expan-
sive powers, the EPA must actually be doing something. 
An EPA that simply oversaw the implementation of 
common law and market remedies would be a humble 
and limited EPA. On the other hand, an EPA that relent-
lessly seeks to expand its authority and is engaged in an 
ongoing review of existing and potential technologies, 
reconsidering and rewriting existing regulations in light 
of changing technology and market conditions, is a 
much more powerful and lucrative agency. 73 
Zywicki's analysis is not uncommon, has roots at least as 
deep as The Federalist, and resonates with much real-world 
experience. I do not think that EPA's performance can be ex-
plained solely in terms of a lust for power."' But there is 
enough truth to this notion to suggest that Professor 
O'Reilly's concerns may be overstated. Agencies do tend to 
read their mandates broadly. Overall, the ratchet effect at 
work in Brown & Williamson is, I think, more likely to oper-
ate in favor of agency authority than against it. 
Two caveats are in order, however. First, many agen-
cies, including EPA, read their mandates broadly but do so 
very slowly. It can take an awfully long time for EPA to pro-
duce a set of regulations. Where the agency has failed to do 
anything during a time of congressional dithering or legis-
lating around the edges, then Brown & Williamson could 
have the antiregulatory consequences described by Profes-
sor O'Reilly. Secondly, the Brown & Williamson approach 
will work in favor of agency authority only if applied 
even-handedly with regard to the regulatory initiatives at is-
sue. If the five-Justice majority has a different approach in 
72. Id. at 24. 
73. Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political 
Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and 
Reform, 13 TuL. L. REv. 845, 890 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
74. Neither does Zywicki, in fact. He also observes that many at EPA are 
drawn to their jobs by a sense of mission and a personal commitment to 
environmental protection. For Zywicki, this only compounds the problem. 
"[T]rue believers" are especially prevalent in environmental 
regulatory agencies. Because they personally need not con-
sider the costs of such regulations, and are isolated from the 
need to consider the trade-off between environmental purity 
and other social goals, such as economic development, those 
passionately committed to the environmentalist cause will 
cases where an agency has long asserted that it does have a 
regulatory power, then too Brown & Williamson will have 
the antiregulatory consequences O'Reilly fears. 
3. Dynamic Interpretation 
Not long after the November 1994 elections, when the Con-
tract With America was still a potent political document and 
a revolution seemed to be occurring in Washington, Profes-
sor John Nagle wrote a review of the leading academic de-
fense of "dynamic statutory interpretation," Professor Wil-
liam Eskridge's book of that title. 75 Nagle argued against the 
dynamic approach. Using the Contract With America as a 
jumping-off point, he suggested that a court truly committed 
to Eskridge's approach should "update" existing statutes in 
light of the clear, though unenacted, preferences of the 104th 
Congress. Notwithstanding his substantial agreement with 
much of the Republican regulatory agenda,76 Nagle argued 
that for a court actually to do so would be illegitimate. His 
example was chosen to give the generally liberal supporters 
of dynamic interpretation pause. American 'Jrucking takes 
this question out of the law reviews and into the courtroom. 
The industry petitioners and their amici argue that the 
CAA as of 1970 incorporated cost-benefit analysis. Like 
many, I find this argument hard to take seriously. 77 The lan-
guage and history of the Act are consistent with the tenor of 
the times: clean air at any cost; human health has no price 
tag. To be sure, the intervening 30 years have seen a marked 
shift in environmental policy (though not the fundamental 
transformation that exponents of cost-benefit analysis 
would like; witness the failure of recent regulatory reform 
efforts). The pure health-based approach seems anachronis-
tic. But, of course, Congress has never amended CAA § 109 
to reflect this shift. 
Now, believers in dynamic interpretation might con-
tend that CAA § 109 should be read consistently with cur-
rently prevailing regulatory principles. But to say that CAA 
§ 109 is a naive anachronism is one thing; to say that there-
fore it should be updated by the courts, rather than amended 
by Congress, is a rather bold legisprudential step. Doing so 
would be a much greater step away from statutory formal-
ism than is the "effective ratification" approach of Brown & 
Williamson. It would be a surprise to see the Court's conser-
find ample room to indulge their personal preferences for en-
vironmental purity. 
Id. at 893. 
75. John Nagle, Newt Gingrich: Dynamic Interpreter, 143 U . PA. L. 
REv. 2209 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DYNAMIC 
STATIJTORY IN'IBRPRETATION (1994)). 
16. Id. at 2249. 
77. This is not the place for a full exposition of the argument in favor of 
the long-standing understanding of the Act One good statement of the 
position is in the Federal Register preamble to the challenged rulemaking 
itself. See U.S. EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for 
Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38652, 38683-88 (July 18, 1997); see also 
McGarity, supra note 60, at 22-28. 
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vatives willing to indulge in such a dynamic reading. 78 
Nonetheless, it is pretty amazing that they are being urged 
to do so by none other than Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), not 
usually known as a fierce advocate of judicial activism. 
Here is an excerpt from Senator Hatch's amicus brief in 
American Trucking: 
The [CAA] must be construed in pari materia with 
later-enacted regulatory reform statutes that direct agen-
cies to favor cost-effective regulatory decisions and to 
mitigate unwarranted regulatory burdens .where possi-
ble. See Vermont Agency, 120 S. Ct. at 1870 n.17. The 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act ("UMRA") requires 
EPA, like all agencies, to select the most cost-effective 
regulatory alternative (or, alternatively, to explain why a 
cost-effective option was not chosen). Pub. L. No. 104-4, 
§205, 109 Stat. 64, 66 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 1535). The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act ("SBREFA") compels agencies to consider 
and minimize the "significant economic impact" of reg-
ulations on "small entities." Pub. L. No. 104-121, 
§241(b)(5), 110 Stat. 847, 864 (1996) (codified at 5 
U.S.C. §604(a)(5)). EPA is correct that UMRA and 
SBREFA do not override the mandates of an agency's or-
ganic statute, see 2 U.S.C. §1535(b)(2); 5 U.S.C. §604 
( a )(5), but, absent clear inconsistency, the Act should not 
be interpreted to defeat Congress's clear directive in fa-
vor of cost-effective regulation. 79 
This is a bolder request than the Court is likely to accept, 
particularly since the milder forms of dynamism (ratifica-
78. Interestingly, on the merits Justice Breyer would clearly be in the 
conservative camp on this issue. That is, he deems pure health-•d 
standard setting, without regard to costs, as silly policy. His book, 
Brealdng the Vicious Circle, is an attack on excessive, noncost-justified 
efforts to eliminate tiny risks. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING lliE 
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993). Thus, 
American Trucking will present a stark choice for Breyer between the 
interpretive methodology he adopted in his Brown & Williamson dissent 
and the regulatory methodology he has argued for in his nonjudicial 
writings. Were he to read CAA § 109 to mandate EPA compliance with the 
themes of Breaking the Vicious Circle, it is a safe bet that fellow Justices 
tion and the reenactment doctrine) cut the other way in this 
case. Even were the Court to be tempted, it is a hard argu-
ment to make here given the failure of across-the-board reg-
ulatory reform proposals.80 Of course, the Court might still 
rule against EPA, pretending that the statute had always al-
lowed or required EPA to take costs into account, but doing 
so really would be pretending. 
V. Conclusion 
It is not always easy to tell what cases will continue to loom 
large through the years. Chevron itself is a reminder. 
Though it came to be the dominant case of administrative 
law and continues to outdistance all others for the 
"most-cited" prize, when it was decided it went largely un-
noticed. And many decisions seemed momentous at the 
time and then sunk beneath the waves. But Brown & Wil-
liamson likely will have important repercussions in many 
areas, not least of them environmental law. Its specific and 
immediate application to the American Trucking Ass 'n case 
suggests that the Court will reverse the D.C. Circuit's 
nondelegation ruling and uphold its long-standing interpre-
tation of the CAA as precluding consideration of costs in 
setting the NAAQS. The more general repercussions will be 
salutary-a tum away from a too-strong reading of Chev-
ron's deference requirement, and toward a broader, contex-
tual approach in statutory interpretation. 
who disagree will be quoting the Brown & Williamson dissent back at 
him-particularly the line about a "legislative mood" not being a law. 
79. Brief of Amici Curiae Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Tom 
Bliley in Support of Cross-Petitioners at 25, American Trucking Ass'n v. 
Browner, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (No. 99-1426). 
80. See Jim Nichols, Revisionists Retreat: Republicans Back Of!Touted 
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Protection of Resources, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 22, 1995, 
at Bl. 
